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Existing literature has examined the predictions and proscriptions of Karl Marx in
response to the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. However, the suggestions put forth by the
Marxist-leaning literature never took hold and state-level banking and ﬁnance policies
have remained largely unchanged. While many criticisms of Marxism exist, this paper
examines Belarus, a ‘neo-communist’ or ‘market-socialist’ state, to provide a new
perspective on the continuation of capitalism in the United States and Europe. In the case
of Belarus, the International Monetary Fund and the Eurasian Economic Community's Anti-
Crisis Fund provided both the critical liquidity needed to temporarily quell the effects of
the ﬁnancial crisis. Their demands meant that Belarus agreed to speed its move away from
the Soviet-era ﬁnance and banking policies and more towards its western capitalist
neighbors. Its failure to implement these policies further hurt its recovery. Examining
Belarus' path to and out of its ﬁnancial crisis makes apparent that the role of the inter-
national lender of last resort (LOLR). The LOLR acts as a key element in protecting states
embroiled in the ﬁnancial crisis from facing the possibility of making the difﬁcult policy
changes put forth by the Marxist literature. By ignoring its promises under the loan
conditions from its LOLRs, Belarus moved further from the recovery promised by the
Marxist suggestions.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Following the start of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, the
literature began to discuss the predictions of Karl Marx,
drawing parallels to Marx's predictions of the global
ﬁnancialization of capital and the subsequent weakening in
power of workers to negotiate (Carver, 2009; Shulman,
2012; Sklansky, 2012; Sustar, 2013; Tabb, 2010a, 2010b).
Interestingly, Sustar (2013) claimed that even the Tea Party
represented Marx's analysis of the middle class with itsarch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. Prod“angry and resentful” attitude toward big business while
remaining procaptialist and conservative. Some more
extreme papers pondered the implosion of capitalism and a
new, left-leaning system taking its place. Hobsbawm and
Rutherford (2011, p. 140) stated that “the most promising
road forward for the left is to attack the failure of our
economies to understand the depth of the crisis of capi-
talism since 2008 e a crisis which, as is increasingly
evident, is far from overcome in the Atlantic countries and
Europe.” The ways in which Marx's crises theory addressed
ﬁnancial overextension (Tabb, 2010a, 2010b) and called for
reform (Buiter, 2008) were discussed as news outlets
highlighted the increased attention paid to Marx, played
out to some respect via “Occupy” movements across the
United States and Europe.uction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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reacted to the ﬁnancial crisis by meaningful left-leaning
reforms. Outside the long-standing criticisms of Marxism,
it is useful to examine Belarus, a European former Soviet
state that did not transition or westernize its economy to
the same extent as its neighbors and maintained some
socialist policies, to showwhy the recommendations of the
Marxist literature have remained largely ignored. The path
Belarus followed towards capitalism has been unlike that of
its Eastern European neighbors, making it an example of
how a less-capitalist European, market socialist state
embroiled in the global ﬁnancial crisis responds. In the
height of the ﬁnancial crisis, it turned to western, market-
oriented mechanisms and accepted aid from international
lenders of last resort (LOLR), agreeing to change its internal
policies in order to do so. It used these mechanisms but
ignored its reform promises, further hurting its recovery. By
examining Belarus' ﬁnancial crisis, it can be shown that the
philosophies and recommendations espoused in by
Marxist-leaning literature fail to inspire policy change
because they fail to adequately address the role of the
modern international LOLRs. Furthermore, the recom-
mendations fall ﬂat when observing how, by Belarus failed
to speed its path towards a more open market-based
economy, its recovery has been hampered.
2. Marxism e A brief review
When examining Marxist-oriented literature, it raises
the question of “which Marxism?” This paper will not be
able to adequately cover the breadth of the schools of
Marxism but will look at trends and modern-day ap-
proaches to applying Marxism to the ﬁnancial crisis.
Shulman (2012) refers to Marxism as the “analysis of the
speciﬁc historical transformations of ‘capitalism’ and
resistance to it, by way of ‘class struggle’.” For this article, a
Marxist-oriented literaturewill be deﬁned as literature that
identiﬁes the perceived contradictions and shortcomings of
capitalism, challenges capitalism as to identify its weak-
nesses, and ultimately, envisions a post-capitalist world
where the identiﬁed contradictions are no longer in exis-
tence (Burawoy, 2000).
Following the death of Karl Marx, branches of Marxism
emerged to build on Classical Marxism's philosophies. The
schools of Marxist thought since Marx's original writings
have continuously strived to bridge the gap between ideas
and real-world practice. For example, Orthodox Marxism
emerged in between the Franco-Prussian War and World
War I, focusing on scientiﬁc and methodological ap-
proaches to the study of society and economics. It was
move to refocus away from criticisms of Classical Marxism's
ambiguities with respect to society and political action. The
years following World War I saw Marxism implemented
politically via Marxism-Leninism and the emergence of the
Communist state. Western Marxism stood in contrast to
Communism among European scholars, who were con-
cerned with how an industrial society affected the indi-
vidual (Bronner, 1990). In the 1960's, a “Marxist revival”
occurred in some academic pockets in the United States
and challenged the strong anti-Communist sentiment
espoused during the height of the cold war (Burawoy,2000). Analytical Marxism emerged prior to the collapse
of the Soviet Union and attempted to bring the philosophy
in line with more modern philosophical approaches by
incorporating rational choice theory.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Marxismwas
largely dismissed by most policymakers, and the academic
literature in defense of Marxism sought to identify the gaps
between Marxism, Soviet Marxism and Soviet Commu-
nism. During the 1990's, political science research on the
whole turned away from general theories of economic and
social change, with Marxism coming under extensive crit-
icism (Lafferty, 2000). The fall of the Soviet Union was to
many a death knell to the legitimacy of Marx's real-world
applicability (Burawoy, 2000). Some research then turned
to defend Marxism by focusing on the ways that the Soviet
Union had never been a true embodiment of the Marxist
ethos. Since the early 1990's, discussion has surrounded
whether the collapse of the Soviet Union was a collapse of
Marxism and communism, or whether it was a collapse of a
system that never achieved the monist Marxist doctrine it
espoused. Questions focused less on the applicability of
Marxism and turned more towards whether Marxism al-
ways resulted in a totalitarian regime, since applications of
Marxism in other countries have similarly resulted in such
systems (Femia, 1993). While it is difﬁcult to apply the term
“Marxism” to any national system without ample room for
debate, there is little doubt that Soviet Communism was
not so much an ideal implementation but more of a mu-
tation of Marxism (Femia, 1993, Kolakowski, 1977). How-
ever, any embodiments of political science philosophies
have deviations from their ideological baseline elements.
The tide has recently turned on Marxism's afﬁliation
only with authoritarian and/or failed regimes. “Occupy”
and “99 Percent” movements embraced by some who live
in Western countries that encountered the ﬁnancial crisis
have been characterized as a renewal of class struggle
(Harvey, 2010). It was seen as a social movement of many
elements and languages, without a ﬁxed agenda but
working under the auspices of an “occupation” necessary to
bring about change and the establishing of new ideals. At
the same time, it was the embodiment of the sense of loss
and anxiety in western cultures (Shulman, 2012). Similarly,
the academic community revived its interest in the pre-
dictions of Karl Marx, resulting in publications highlighting
the applicability of Marx's predictions to the ﬁnancial crisis.
3. Post-crisis Marxist literature predicted a systemic
change in the global ﬁnancial system
Marxists-oriented literature maintains that the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis was “the moment when capitalism's con-
tradictions and the limits to the development of capital
(that are inherent in capital itself) emerge.” (Giacche, 2011).
Tabb (2010a, 2010b) lays the blame for the ﬁnancial crisis
on what Marx described as a “new aristocracy of ﬁnance.”
Davies (2011) points to “zero-sum capitalism” as the
enemy.
The Marxist-oriented literature examines the changing
nature of capital, its ﬂight from production and application
instead to speculation in many western economies
(Giacche, 2011; Tabb, 2010a, 2010b). The result was
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speculation and masked by market bubbles. The resulting
depression in demand for commodities paired with a lack
of capital able to ﬁnd valorization. The two emerged quickly
and deﬂated market bubbles, leaving individuals, business
owners, and banking ﬁnanciers without means to repay
their debts. Some scholars pointed out that the inability for
anyone to legitimately predict the full scale of the ﬁnancial
crisis as another element predicted by Marx's work.
The fall in proﬁts is a main tenant when examining the
causes of the ﬁnancial crisis. Giacche (2011) points out that
almost all major western capitalist countries saw proﬁts
stagnate or fall in the decades preceding the ﬁnancial crisis,
but categorizes falling proﬁts as an indirect cause, as does
Kliman (2009). However, Perri (2011) characterized the
falling rate of proﬁt as one of the key factors that caused the
economic crisis.
Many authors examine the growth in social and eco-
nomic inequality between the rich and poor, suggesting
that the working class has been subjugated at the hands of
proﬁt-seeking ﬁnanciers (Giacche, 2011; Hobsbawm &
Rutherford, 2011; Panitch, 2009; Tabb, 2009). The litera-
ture highlights inequality that has created a de-facto single
working class, dependent on credit cards and mortgages to
maintain a false middle-class living standard while their
bargaining rights suffered at the hands of weakened trade
unions. In addition, social welfare lost its place as a top
governmental priority as legislators saw the purported
beneﬁts of capitalism and responded to lobbyists protect-
ing their interests by slashing social safety nets and societal
protections. The parallels between the current situation
andMarx's warnings of the rising exploitation of labor have
been a key factor in explaining the ﬁnancial crisis and
looking for solutions.
Marx acknowledges that the path out of ﬁnancial crisis
would be different for different countries, and many
themes emerge with respect to suggested paths out of the
crisis. Davies (2011) maintains that any sustainable recov-
ery will need to involve new mechanisms of production,
ownership, and lending that are not subject to the bubbles
and whims of the global ﬁnancial market. Hobsbawm and
Rutherford (2011) suggests that Marxists should exploit
the misunderstanding of the true consequences of the
“crisis of capitalism” and use political leverage to swing
decision makers left to ensure equitable social and eco-
nomic distribution of resources. Marx's call for the
“centralization of credit in the banks of the state” has been
put forth as a solution to the ﬁnancial crisis. Even ardent
capitalists have suggested solutions that lean heavily to the
left. For example, Buiter (2008) has called for the end of the
privatization of the ﬁnancial sector and the creation of a
public ﬁnance utility in the United States. Hemaintains that
private ﬁnance no longer contributes to society when it is
able to take unmitigated risks with little private insurance,
knowing that the public sector will provide a way out.
Indeed, the “too big to fail” response to private banking
crises awakened an outcry among followers of Karl Marx
and Adam Smith alike.
This brief overview of Marxist literature's reaction to the
ﬁnancial crisis might suggest that a new perspective on
capitalismwould be a likely outcome of the economic crisisand that leftist ideology would ﬁnd new footing. However,
when considering the causes and effects of the ﬁnancial
crisis, these works do not explain the case of Belarus. By
examining Belarus' unique path since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, its motivations behind its choices, and its
reaction to the ﬁnancial crisis, it is possible to see how and
why the ﬁnancial crisis affected it differently than the rest
of Europe. Its embrace of international LOLRs and problems
after failing to reform weaken the argument that the
teachings of Marx could be applied to 21st century western
economies.
4. Belarus embraces a social market economic
structure
While this paper examines Belarus in a context of
Marxism's reemergence and subsequent dismissal in policy
conversations, it cannot be mistaken to argue that Belarus
is aMarxist or even aMarxist-Leninist state. Marxism exists
in Belarus more as a nation-building point of history. In
addition to the oft-mentionedMinsk streets bearingMarx's
and Lenin's names, the First Congress of the Russian Social
Democratic Working Party was held secretly in Minsk in
1898, its location restored and open to the public as a
museum showing the covert birth of the Communist Party
in the Soviet Union (Medish, 1963). Rather than Marxist,
Belarus' post-Soviet path, is one that led to a “social mar-
ket” economy that retained some of its centralized target-
ing of production and wages as well as ownership in many
of its largest industries. Although its economic structure
was not the result of a strong ideology in favor of its
Marxist-Leninist roots, it provides an interesting example
of a country between free market capitalism and the
market-eschewing nations encouraged by Marxist
literature.
If it can be argued that ﬁnance is the biggest industry of
the twenty-ﬁrst century (Sklansky, 2012), in Belarus, the
situation is markedly different. As most Western and
Eastern European businesses and industries depend on
money lent by commercial banks (even if said industries
beneﬁt from state subsidies vis-a-vis protectionism and tax
breaks), their respective states have separated the owners
of capital from their industry's management via stock
markets and commodities exchanges. Belarus, conversely,
prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, had continued to centrally hold
the largest stake in many of its most crucial industries.
Some of Belarus's pre-ﬁnancial crisis policies were
similar to its neighbors, but with different motivations. The
Baltics weremaintaining a currency peg to the Euro prior to
the ﬁnancial crisis in order to meet the standards to enter
into the Eurozone. Belarus, conversely, maintained its cur-
rency peg but did not seek EU membership, pursuing its
own internally-focused policies. However, while Pourchot
and Stivachtis (2014) argue that Belarus is in the process
of strengthening its economic ties with the European Union
at the expense of a stronger union with Russia, it is never
certain that Belarus' government will choose to look either
eastward or westward, but rather toward strategy and
opportunity.
In addition, Belarus has continued to follow an output-
based target system for its economy. Quantitative targets
H. Bell, R. Bell / Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2015) 153e160156are set in place by ministries and administrative territories.
Targets determine production and state-owned enterprises
and government-supported companies must adhere to the
mandated targets. A 2014 IMF report criticized the wage-
setting structure, also based on targets rather than pro-
duction, and both private and state-owned enterprises are
affected by these targets. Because of these targets, there is
very little regional and sectoral variation in wages outside
of Minsk (IMF, 2014), and thus, Belarus had a relatively low
Gini index in the late nineties and early twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury (World Bank, 2015).
4.1. Background e Post-Soviet Belarus turns toward a social
market economy
Belarus' economic transition followed a markedly
different path than former Eastern bloc and European post-
Soviet states following its separation from the Soviet Union
(Izyumov & Vahaly, 2008). While many Eastern European
states looked westward towards EU membership and
sought integration, Belarus ultimately hunkered down and
tried to continue more closely to its prior system. Belarus'
European post-Soviet neighbors opened up their markets
to foreign investors and by 2008, foreign-owned banks
controlled most of the lending market. Belarus, conversely,
kept the majority of its industry state-owned, and neither
did it welcome foreign investment. Nor did Belarus follow
Russia's shock therapy approach to abrupt privatization of
industries.
In the early 1990's, Belarus did not have the same in-
centives or needs as its neighbors to privatize. It lacked the
investors needed to implement a “shock therapy” plan like
Russia (Lych, 1996). Nor did it have the inclination towards
membership in western multinational organizations like
the European Union (EU), a system that heartily encour-
aged its eastern neighbors to adopt western-style capital-
ism by extending the promise of development funds after
meeting membership criteria (White, 2011).When asked in
a referendum in 1991 whether they wanted the Soviet
Union to continue, 83% of Belarusians voted in favor (White,
2010).
A principle and oft-cited reason that Belarus resisted the
siren calls of development funds is that it appreciated a
well-functioning industrial infrastructure that Belarusian
leadership believed would be its path forward after the
transition in the early 1990s. Belarus had known greater
prosperity as a result of its inclusion in the USSR than did its
neighboring Soviet Republics. During the latter half of the
19th century and the beginning of the 20th century,
Belarus' stagnated manufacturing sector saw Belarus as the
poorest region within European Russia (Ioffe, 2004).
The Second World War had taken the lives of a quarter
of Belarus's inhabitants and leveled three quarters of its
towns and regions, destroying the entire capital of Minsk
(Ioffe, 2004). Belarus's clean slate meant the post-war
reconstruction period turned the young Soviet Republic
into an industrial center and brought relative prosperity.
The Soviet government invested in capital development,
and as a result Belarus increased its industrial output be-
tween 1940 and 1986 to a level far exceeding its neigh-
boring Republics, and it was ﬁfty percent greater than theaverage of the entire USSR. Its output was matched by a
strong light industrial and thriving agricultural sector.
Consequently, the growth rate of income per capita be-
tween 1970 and 1986 was greater than any other Soviet
Republic (Ioffe, 2004).
In addition, the Soviet Republic of Belarus consistently
produced goods of higher quality relative to its neighbors
and was given the USSR's quality logo on more of its
products than any other Republic (Ioffe, 2004). The quality
factor would remain important after Belarus' indepen-
dence, as it would not need to change its industries to
compete outside the closed Soviet system. Belarus was thus
better able to weather the great economic challenges of
post-Soviet states, that is, an internal adjustment to
competing with international export competition and a
structural change in command-style economies (Pop-
Eleches, 2008).
Since the relative prosperity and growth in Belarus was
so much greater than its European neighbors, Lych (1996)
argues that the large quantity of established industries
able to produce high-quality goods which could compete
on the international market lessened the urgency to pri-
vatize and reform. The World Bank observed in 1995 that
Belarus had privatized fewer industries than any European
post-Soviet states-only thirteen percent of its state-owned
enterprises and organizations had privatized or been con-
verted to joint stock.
Many post-Soviet states chose incumbent leaders who
ran the previous administration to manage their new in-
stitutions; however, Belarus's ﬁrst government was post-
Soviet leader and head of state, Stanislau Shushkevich,
was an academic physicist (Ioffe, 2004), who advocated for
market reform, although he was opposed by most of the
parliament and the prime minister Vyacheslav Kebich, who
believed the future lay in alliance with Russia. Lych (1996)
argues that key economic specialists were veterans of the
administrative-command.
Whereas Belarus had outperformed its Soviet neighbor
republics, it began to lag behind its post-soviet neighbor
states. Its GDP, output and trade declined at a rate faster
than other CIS states each year between 1993 and 1995
(Lych, 1996). Between 1993 and 1994, prices rose and real
per-capita income fell. Older Belarusian voters, who out-
numbered their younger counterparts in voter turnout,
were haunted by memories of poverty and were thus
reluctant to embrace market reforms as they saw their
living standards beginning to slip (Ioffe, 2004; Lych,
1996).
The Belarusian population elected Alexander Luka-
shenko in 1994 following a campaign run on an anti-
corruption platform, and in him they saw someone from
common roots who would “unabashedly ﬁght the
nomenklatura.” The pain inﬂicted by overly slow market
reform had soured the Belarusian people not only on re-
form, but on their implementers. The ﬁrst year that fol-
lowed his presidency saw a drop in the already-low rate of
privatization. Two years later, Lych (1996) reported that
Belarus' progress towards market reform had thus far been
carried at a slow pace in relation to its neighbors. Their
choice was carried forward, as Belarusians saw few op-
portunities to vote for opposition candidates in the
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win each presidential election held since his ﬁrst (Bader,
2012).
In the subsequent years before the global crisis, Belarus
remained dependent on cheap fuel imports from Russia. Its
location on the transit route for both oil and natural gas
pipelines, along with its close relationship with Russia, has
seen Belarus the beneﬁciary of preferential, non-market
based pricing schemes for fossil fuels (Newnham, 2011).
Belarus has additionally been able to sell these commod-
ities to its Western neighbors at market price (Tsygankov,
2012), and estimates indicate that ten to thirteen percent
of Belarus' GDP came from these subsidies (EBRD, 2007;
Ioffe, 2004). In 2006, Belarus was receiving the same
thousand cubic meters of gas from Russia that was sold in
Europe for one hundred dollars for less than half that
amount (EBRD, 2007).
Furthermore, a key non-petroleum export, Potash, pri-
marily produced by state-owned Belaruskali, had been
receiving above-market price protection by entering a
partnership with Russian ﬁrm Uralkali and creating an
informal cartel. Russia's growing economy in the early and
mid-2000's increased demand for capital goods that
Belarus was able to supply, with easy access to Russian
markets, integrated supply chains, providing a boost to
Belarus' competitiveness (EBRD, 2007). With these re-
lationships, Belarus had few incentives towards speeding
its transition from a centrally controlled system of largely
state-owned enterprises.
Internally, its wage and output targets had a positive, if
not sustainable, impact on domestic demand (IMF, 2010).
Additionally, Belarus never developed strong policies to
support development of business, neither with the general
population, nor, unlike Russia, with the country's oligarchs.
According to EBRD, its private sector share of GDP remained
at twenty ﬁve percent from 2002 until 2007 (EBRD, 2008).
The majority of the population still works either in the
public sector or for wholly or partially state-owned enter-
prises. Until 2006, Belarus had a ‘Golden Share’ rule,
granting the government the right to exercise a majority
vote in any private company by introducing a preferential
share, and undermining the development of foreign direct
investment (Korma Regional Executive Committee, 2008).
The level of entrepreneurship in Belarus is much lower
than that of its neighbors, including Russia, and small and
medium enterprises account for only ten percent of the
economy (Akulava, 2012).
Belarus has described itself in policy documents as a
“socially oriented market economy” characterized as “a
competitive market economy with mixed state and market
ownership on an equal footing supported by social welfare
policies.” (Nuti, 2005, p. 101). It been described as a market
economy, but one that avoids market reform and has sus-
tained itself and minimized the impact of disruption
through, “strong state intervention in the economy, which
has included subsidies to unproﬁtable enterprises, admin-
istrative price controls” and (at times) “inﬂationary cur-
rency emission” (Rontoyanni, 2005, p. 131).
These drivers of the Belarusian economic choices show
that rational self-interest and strong existing infrastructure
and institutions led Belarus to keep many of its existingsystems and allow them to continuewith fewer post-Soviet
economic reforms than their neighbors and avoid risking
the fall-out from a disruption in the systems and processes
that had brought them out of near-destitution and into
relative prosperity.
4.2. Belarus enters the global ﬁnancial crisis
Belarus initially weathered the global ﬁnancial crisis
better than its neighbors and trading partners. The state's
grip on industry and the strongly centralized powers
allowed the administration to directly steer the country
away from the crisis as it swept through Europe, the United
States, and Russia. State ownership of many industries
allowed the leadership in Minsk to control the behavior of
large economic actors aimed to increase domestic demand
in the face of decreasing exports (Kruk, 2013). The tactics
worked initially and superﬁcially. Belarus was one of only
two Eastern European countries to see a positivedalbeit
smalldgrowth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2009
and it was able to keep its currency peg of 3000 Belarusian
rubles to the U.S. dollar. The following year, its GDP
increased by 7.7 percent, despite its exports to the Euro
Zone dropping by almost 45 percent in 2009 and largely
stagnating in 2010 (European Commission, 2013).
Eventually, stimulating domestic demand was not
enough to offset the dip in trade by its main trading part-
ners Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union (primarily
Germany and the Netherlands) (United Nations Statistics
Division, 2013), many of which depreciated their currency
to stay competitive. By June of 2009, the countries at the
heart of the ﬁnancial crisis began to migrate towards the
perceived security of the U.S. dollar. The Russian Ruble
began to depreciate against the dollar, as did the Ukrainian
Hryvnia. The Euro followed suit at the end of the year.
Belarus initially tried to hold fast to its currency peg. Ex-
ports suffered as the real price for Belarus's goods increased
with respect to its trading partners. Its foreign currency
reserves dwindled as it became less globally competitive.
Increasingly, Belarus was unable to make up for dips in
export.
By 2011, Belarus's ability to command its way out of the
ﬁnancial crisis was dwindling. It was facing a balance-of-
payment crisis, with shrinking foreign currency and gold
reserves. It depreciated its currency and by end of year, the
ruble had dropped to almost a third of its value with 8500
Belarusian rubles to the dollar. Consumer prices grew by
107 percent (Bornukova, 2012), driven mainly by a sudden
increase in the prices of imported goods. The price ﬂuctu-
ations more greatly affected the higher income earners
purchasing imported goods, as many essential
domestically-produced goods and services were subject to
price controls. While the prices of many goods increased,
long-standing price controls meant that much of the pop-
ulationwas somewhat shielded from the entire effect of the
rise in inﬂation. Domestically-produced items not subject
to price controls, for example meat and poultry, saw a rise
in price almost in percentage parity to the exchange rate
depreciation (Bornukova, 2012).
More harmful to the average population, and especially
to pensioners, was the drop in real income and the
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average real income of a Belarusian decreased by ﬁfteen
percent in 2011 compared to the year before. Pensioners
saw their stipends fall in real terms by 29 percent. The
percentage of the population that fell below the poverty
line more than doubled from the beginning to the end of
2011 (Bornukova, 2012). It could have been argued that the
fall in real income for pensioners would be the greatest
threat to the Belarusian system. It is the pensioners who by
majority believe that the demise of the Soviet Union was a
mistake and support the resistance to westernize (White,
2010). It follows that a failure in the current system could
have hurt that support. Lukashenko attempted to placate
the pensioner population by increasing pensions ahead of
the 2010 presidential election, furthering the ﬁnancial
crisis but maintaining support for the current system.
5. Belarus' path out of crisis
Belarus's journey into, and initial response to, the
ﬁnancial crisis was markedly different from its neighbors,
but its overall attempts to repair its economy is an area
where it converges with its western counterparts. The path
Belarus took in seeking away out of the ﬁnancial crisis puts
it in demonstrated contradiction to the Marxist literature
advising on paths out of the ﬁnancial crisis. Belarus paid lip
service to LOLRs, agreeing to concessions that would take
the economy on a more wholly market-based path. The
international LOLRsmade conditions for the loans, bringing
Belarus more greatly in line with the western policies that
Marxist literature blamed for the crisis.
Prior to its 2011 crisis, Belarus sought and accepted a 2.5
billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 2009 to bolster their gold and foreign currency
reserves and to support the ﬁxed exchange rate. In return,
Belarus agreed to undergo a ﬁfteen-month economic re-
form program. As Belarus began to feel the full effects of the
ﬁnancial crisis in 2011, the IMF later increased the loan
amount to 3.5 billion, and Belarus agreed to implement
structural reforms aimed at improving macroeconomic
policy in the real economy. Belarus later accepted a 3 billion
dollar loan from the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Com-
munity's Anti-crisis Fund. The Community's loan came
with conditions, including the sale of 7.5 billion dollars in
state-owned assets (many of which Russia had interest in
purchasing) and increased bank lending to the economy
(“Belarus Ratiﬁes Treaty,” 2009).
6. The international lender of last resort
The LOLR solidiﬁed its role as a crucial lifeboat for many
countries during times of ﬁnancial crises during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, when many
countries experienced runs on banks simultaneously with
currency crises (Goodhart & Illing, 2002). Originally, it was
a country's central bank that played the role of LOLR to
cushion liquidity shocks. As globalization connected econ-
omies, ﬁnancial crises were increasingly an international
problem for stats rather than a domestic issue. Capital
ﬂows began regularly crossing borders, and thus, a ﬁnancial
crisis in one country could affect the situation in another.The risks associated with such interconnectivity were
identiﬁed as the “international ﬁnancial contagion risks”
and the response to these risks was to internationalize the
role of LOLR (Huang & Goodhart, 2000).
In the 1990s, the literature began to examine the
increasing role of an international LOLR, that is, it began to
ask about the appropriateness of a multinational organi-
zation or institution acting as LOLR to an entire country's
banking system. This debate was framed by an acceptance
in the 1990s of the greater efﬁciency on the macro level
appreciated by countries that were open to international
capital ﬂows (China and India's growing economies during
this period aside) (Fischer, 2002). To accept the principle
that international capital ﬂows increased overall well-
being, it was also necessary to accept that ﬁnancial crises
must be kept at a minimum, thus bringing to the forefront
the crucial role of the international LOLR.
The IMF, has become principal international LOLR,
although its founders deliberately wrote its Articles of
Agreement to avoid the IMF taking on this role. However,
Boughton and Lombardi (2009) and Calomiris (1998) argue
that the IMF has been going in the direction of becoming
principal international LOLR since the end of Bretton
Woods in the 1970s. Russia led the way towards a Eurasian
international LOLR when it created the Anti-crisis Fund for
the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) in 2009. Its pri-
mary goal is to assist EEC members (Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan) hardest hit by
the ﬁnancial crisis (EurAsEc Anti-Crisis Fund, 2013). As with
the IMF, the monies in the EEC's Anti-crisis fund are avail-
able with conditions for its recipients.
Intervention by a LOLR invites criticism; its very exis-
tence possibly contributing to a suspension of market
discipline by taking away the risk of failure. This stands in
contrast to the original Bangehot LOLR principle to “lend
freely, at a high rate, against good collateral,” Any LOLR
must have “technical autonomy and effective sanctioning
power” (Giannini, 1999, 2). Giannini (1999, 1) argued that
the only way to minimize the moral hazard associated
with an LOLR was to rely on the “broader legal and insti-
tutional setupdon regulation in the broadest sense of the
word.” However, in light of international organizations
legitimacy coming from a critical mass of members and
the buy-in of those, international LOLRs depend on the
cooperation of state-level leaders to maintain its ability to
lend funds with conditions attached. Often international
LOLRs make loans without such collateral prerequisites as
their state-level counterparts, but instead make conditions
for the loans that countries adhere to when accepting the
bailout funds.
When Belarus accepted IMF assistance, it also accepted
IMF's conditions for greater privatization, its critiques, and
its guidance. The IMF's goal for Belarus includes tightening
of monetary, budget, and tax policies. Belarus furthermore
agreed to reforms in its exchange rate policy (Lis &
Koliadina, 2012). Belarus's acceptance of assistance from
the EEC Anti-crisis Fund meant it agreed to sell some of its
state-owned industries to Russia and further privatize
other industries, as well as agreeing to reform monetary,
budget and tax policies, with some emphasis on easing
tariffs between Belarus and other EEC members.
H. Bell, R. Bell / Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2015) 153e160 159That a post-Soviet state would promise reform when
offered a lifeline by a LOLR is not a new concept. Pop-
Eleches (2008) argued that regardless of a state's ideolog-
ical differences with market capitalism, in Eastern Europe,
states that were experiencing hard currency crises were
more likely to seek and accept assistance from the IMF
during the 1990s. His analysis found that Eastern European
states with reformist-minded governments were statically
equally as likely as states whose governments resisted re-
forms to make necessary concessions needed to enter IMF
programs. In Belarus, in 2010, the prospect of an upcoming
election paired with a hard currency shortage saw the
government ready to set aside their partisan differences
with the IMF and agree to implement the requisite privat-
ization programs for IMF assistance. In fact, it had begun to
look to privatization to solve its hard currency problem
before seeking IMF assistance as a way out of its ﬁnancial
crisis. In times of strong inﬂation (over 140 percent), former
communist states in Eastern Europe are far more likely to
initiate IMF-style reforms.
Although some Marxist literature heralded the remarks
by Buiter (2008) that private ﬁnance, with its risks and
bubbles, should give way to the public sector to regulate
and control, Belarus, already with a strong grip on its
ﬁnancial system, was promising to open itself up to the
global ﬁnancial system and decrease its strong tradition of
state ownership. It promised to deviate from its own
mechanism of production, ownership, and lending
(championed by Davies (2011) as a way out of the crisis)
and go towards the uncertainties of the global ﬁnancial
market that Davies (2011) said was the wrong path from
the crisis.
It should not be argued, however, that Belarus sprung
into reform upon agreement to the terms of the interna-
tional LOLRs (IMF, 2013). In a 2012 report, the IMF noted
that Belarus has made little progress in its market reforms
and has reversed some of the price liberalizations put into
place in 2009e2010. The IMF criticized Belarus for
continuing to focus on output (rather than proﬁt), at the
expense of efﬁciency, as well as its distortions of market
indicators as a result of government-controlled investment,
the dominance of state-run banks, and an inﬂexible labor
market (Lis & Koliadina, 2012). In addition, Belarus's last
tranche of the EECs Anti-crisis Fund was delayed in late
2013, as it had not yet met the reforms and privatizations
necessary for continued support of the EEC (“Decision on
Sixth Tranche,” 2013). Furthermore, while a country can
attempt to control its banking sectors, it has amore difﬁcult
time controlling its population's trust, and many of Belarus'
citizens prefer foreign currency. Although Belarus agreed to
market-focused reform, its lag in their implementation has
been cause for further issues (rather than their salvation),
including slow growth, trade imbalances, and pressure on
banks that are experiencing shortages in ruble funding
(IMF, 2014).
The connection to the Marxist literature can be seen in
the steadfast nature of the international LOLR. Ultimately,
the international LOLRs, although dependent on quotas
given by the very countries hit hardest by the ﬁnancial
crisis, did not buckle or weaken in the face of global
ﬁnancial crisis. Marxism's appeal never made it past theliterature and occasional public demonstrations to applied
policy because there has, heretofore, been no need for such
grand structural and institutional reform anywhere in the
western world. When Belarus faced its own ﬁnancial crisis,
it ﬁrst turned wholly towards LOLRs and promised reforms
that would increase its dependence on the global market.
When it largely ignored its promises, its problems per-
sisted. In the current interdependent world, the literature
on Marx's solutions no longer provides answers, or even
viable suggestions.
7. Conclusion
When Belarus's leadershipdnotoriously skeptical of
Western reforms and outside intervention by even its
alliesdis willing to promise market-based reforms in times
of ﬁnancial crisis to qualify for much-needed liquidity, it
should be little wonder that the Marxist advice espoused in
the thick of the ﬁnancial crisis has been largely ignored by
policymakers. When Belarus ignored its promises and sunk
further from recovery, it lends credence that reform away
from market-based capitalism is not effective in the glob-
alized economy. By examining the case of Belarus, it is
possible to see how international LOLRs not only maintain
current systems' status quo, but can also compel a state to
desire greater integration to the global market. Belarus'
continued struggles as a result of ignoring the reforms
show further that closing oneself off frrm the global market
and attempting does not provide relief. The existing
Marxist-leaning literature, by ignoring the situation in
Belarus, fails to see the game-changing impact that, among
other factors, strong LOLRs have in maintaining current
market-based practices. Predictions of protests-cum-
reform, a change to the global order, and a movement
away from market-based, proﬁt-seeking practices will
continue to come up short as long as there are viable
mechanismsdincluding international LOLRsdto keep the
current systems aﬂoat.References
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